A week ago, NTIA announced
that the proposal developed by the Internet multistakeholder community
to transition the U.S. Government’s stewardship role for the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions met the criteria NTIA outlined in March 2014.
The announcement was an important milestone in the U.S. Government’s
effort to complete the privatization of the Internet’s domain name
system. The transition will help ensure the continued leadership of the
private sector in making decisions related to the technical underpinning
of the Internet, which has helped the Internet thrive as a platform for
innovation, economic growth, and free speech.
NTIA worked with other U.S. Government agencies and conducted a thorough review of the Internet community’s proposal
to ensure it met our criteria. NTIA also found that the proposal
adequately addressed relevant internal control principles, in a review recommended
by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). In addition, a
panel of corporate governance experts concluded that the plan is
consistent with the sound principles of good governance.
NTIA’s assessment of the proposal has earned praise from a range of
individuals, industry organizations and civil society groups. Here’s
what they are saying....
BEREC
Chair Wilhelm Eschweiler represented BEREC at the OECD Ministerial
Meeting on the “Digital Economy: Innovation, Growth and Social
Prosperity” which took place in Cancún, Mexico, from 20-23 June 2016. In
particular, Mr. Eschweiler participated as a speaker in the panel
discussions regarding “Tomorrow’s Internet of Things (IoT)” on 23 June
2016 where he discussed the OECD report on IoT and highlighted the main
messages of the BEREC Report on “Enabling the Internet of Things”. “Since
connectivity is an essential part of, and a precondition for, the
Internet of Things, it is vital that regulatory frameworks concerning
telecommunication are fit for purpose”, the BEREC Chair emphasized.
Depending on national circumstances, regulatory telecom frameworks might
need a ”refreshment” in order to create an environment where IoT
services can thrive and which fosters innovation and competition.
Therefore, legislators should consider reviewing their telecom laws in
order to adjust them if appropriate. In this line, the BEREC Report on
“Enabling the Internet of Things” examines if and where adjustments to
the EU regulatory telecom framework might be required. The
BEREC Chair also pointed out that, from a regulator’s perspective, in
particular the automotive industry and the energy industry are areas
where the Internet of Things is becoming more and more important. For
both types of IoT services – connected cars and smart meters – usually
mobile connectivity and SIM cards are used. BEREC and national
regulatory authorities in the European Union are in close dialogue in
particular with these industries as well as network operators in order
to remove existing barriers and to enable corresponding business models.
In 1959, Carter invented a device, which he named for himself, that permitted users of mobile radio systems to interconnect their landline telephone with the radio system to permit mobile and fixed users to communicate with each other. Consider, for example, the ability to use a Carterfone to link a marine radio to the telephone line, allowing someone on a boat to talk to someone on a telephone.
AT&T advised its customers that the Carterfone, if used in conjunction with an AT&T telephone, would subject the end user to penalties pursuant to AT&T's FCC tariff number 132, which provided that:
No equipment, apparatus, circuit or device not furnished by the telephone company shall be attached to or connected with the facilities furnished by the telephone company, whether physically, by induction or otherwise ....
Carter filed a private antitrust suit against AT&T, and the District Court referred the matter in 1966 to the FCC.
Before the FCC, AT&Tagain failed to demonstrate how competitive CPE would harm the network. The Commission concluded that AT&T's tariff was unreasonable and discriminatory and ordered the restrictive tariff provisions stricken. The Commission was troubled by the tariff provision that would have permitted end users to install AT&T-manufactured equipment with exactly the same functionality offered by the Carterfone, but not the Carterfone itself. The Commission determined that a customer desiring to improve the functionality of the telephone network by interconnecting a piece of equipment not manufactured by the phone company should be permitted to do so, so long as that equipment does not harm the network. As stated by Huber, Kellogg, and Thorne, "Unvarnished claims of threatened harm to the network would no longer suffice;" from here out, AT&T would have to demonstrate specific harm to prohibit competitive CPE. The Commission also rejected AT&T's arguments that opening the network to competitive CPE would have adverse economic impact on AT&T's telephone service. Opening the telephone network to interconnection with foreign attachments or customer premise equipment opened the telephone network to interconnection with modems, fax machines, answering machines and was one of the necessary preconditions that paved the way for the Internet. In a parallel proceeding in this time, the FCC had initiated the Computer Inquiries.
Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service; Thomas F. Carter and Carter Electronics Corp., Dallas, Tex. (Complainants), v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., Associated Bell System Companies, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest (Defendants), Docket Nos. 16942, 17073, Decision, 13 FCC 2d 420 (1968) (Carterfone), recon. denied, 14 FCC 2d 571 (1968).
Enabling Growth and Innovation in the Digital Economy canvasses
eight cross-cutting areas and is the product of a Department-wide
collaborative effort, organized around the Digital Economy Leadership
Team’s four policy pillars: I.) The Free and Open Internet; II.) Trust
and Security Online; III.) Innovation and Emerging Technologies; and
IV.) Access and Skills. It is an anthology of the major initiatives of
the Commerce Department over the course of the past seven years in
pursuit of a more inclusive, dynamic, and productive digital economy for
the American people and the users of digital technologies around the
world.
The Rural Utilities Service (RUS), hereinafter referred to as the Agency, is confirming the interim final rule published in the Federal Register
on July 30, 2015, which amends its regulation for the Rural Broadband
Access Loan and Loan Guarantee Program (Broadband Loan Program).
The Federal Communications Commission was established in 1934 during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. It was not, however, something new created out of the ether. Rather, the FCC assimilated authority from other preexisting agencies. The goal was to create one independent agency with expertise over communications. The FCC assimilated
authority over cable landing rights from the Department of State.
The Communications Act allowed the FCC additional authority, including regulation of rates of interstate and international common carriers, and domestic administration of international agreements relating generally to electronic communication. Government officials had been unhappy with the Interstate Commerce Commission's oversight of communications carriers, as the ICC has been entirely preoccupied with railroad regulation. AT&T was also seen as growing in political power, which it was effectively leveraging at the state public utility commission level.
In 1933, a Department of Commerce Committee recommended that "the communications service, as far as congressional action is involved, should be regulated by a single body." In February 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress urging the creation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The Communications Act was signed into law by President Roosevelt on June 1934.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was a former independent agency of the US Government, created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It was the first independent agency. Its mission was to regulate common carriers such as railroads and trucking.
In 1887 Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, making the railroads the first industry subject to Federal regulation. Congress passed the law largely in response to public demand that railroad operations be regulated. The act also established a five-member enforcement board known as the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the years following the Civil War, railroads were privately owned and entirely unregulated. The railroad companies held a natural monopoly in the areas that only they serviced.
Monopolies are generally viewed as harmful because they obstruct the free competition that determines the price and quality of products and services offered to the public. The railroad monopolies had the power to set prices, exclude competitors, and control the market in several geographic areas. Although there was competition among railroads for long-haul routes, there was none for short-haul runs. Railroads discriminated in the prices they charged to passengers and shippers in different localities by providing rebates to large shippers or buyers. These practices were especially harmful to American farmers, who lacked the shipment volume necessary to obtain more favorable rates.
Early political action against these railroad monopolies came in the 1870s from “Granger” controlled state legislatures in the West and South. The Granger Movement had started in the 1860s providing various benefits to isolated rural communities. State controls of railroad monopolies were upheld by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois (1877). State regulations and commissions, however, proved to be ineffective, incompetent, and even corrupt. In the 1886 Wabash case, the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois law outlawing long-and-short haul discrimination. Nevertheless, an important result of Wabash was that the Court clearly established the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. (See Gibbons v. Ogden.)
The Interstate Commerce Act addressed the problem of railroad monopolies by setting guidelines for how the railroads could do business. The act became law with the support of both major political parties and pressure groups from all regions of the country. Applying only to railroads, the law required "just and reasonable" rate changes; prohibited special rates or rebates for individual shippers; prohibited "preference" in rates for any particular localities, shippers, or products; forbade long-haul/short-haul discrimination; prohibited pooling of traffic or markets; and most important, established a five-member Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
In 1910, with the Mann-Elkins Act (enacted June 18, 1910, signed by Pres. William Taft) expanded the ICC's jurisdiction to include telegraph, telephone and cable companies, placing them under federal common carrier regulation.The ICC could determine whether rates were "unjust" and "unreasonable."
In 1934 the ICC's jurisdiction over communications carriers was transferred to the newly created Federal Communications Commission. - the recommendation to transfer jurisdiction from the ICC to the FCC was based in part on the ICC's preoccupation with regulating railroads, the need for a specialized agency to deal with communications, and the growing power and skill ofAT&T to influence governments.
TATEL and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges: For the third
time in seven years, we confront an effort by the Federal
Communications Commission to compel internet openness—
commonly known as net neutrality—the principle that
broadband providers must treat all internet traffic the same regardless of source. In our first decision, Comcast Corp. v.
FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010), we held that the
Commission had failed to cite any statutory authority that
would justify its order compelling a broadband provider to
adhere to certain open internet practices. In response, relying
on section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
Commission issued an order imposing transparency, anti-
blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband
providers. In our second opinion, Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d
623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), we held that section 706 gives the
Commission authority to enact open internet rules. We
nonetheless vacated the anti-blocking and anti-discrimination
provisions because the Commission had chosen to classify
broadband service as an information service under the
Communications Act of 1934, which expressly prohibits the
Commission from applying common carrier regulations to
such services. The Commission then promulgated the order at
issue in this case—the 2015 Open Internet Order—in which it
reclassified broadband service as a telecommunications
service, subject to common carrier regulation under Title II of
the Communications Act. The Commission also exercised its
statutory authority to forbear from applying many of Title II’s
provisions to broadband service and promulgated five rules to
promote internet openness. Three separate groups of
petitioners, consisting primarily of broadband providers and
their associations, challenge the Order, arguing that the
Commission lacks statutory authority to reclassify broadband
as a telecommunications service, that even if the Commission
has such authority its decision was arbitrary and capricious,
that the Commission impermissibly classified mobile
broadband as a commercial mobile service, that the
Commission impermissibly forbore from certain provisions of
Title II, and that some of the rules violate the First
Amendment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
deny the petitions for review.
MCI was an innovative long distance company that radicalized the telecommunications market. Started in the 1960s, the business plan was to use radio licenses to provide long distance service between Chicago and St. Louis. MCI's application to provide service was approved by the FCC in 1969. But AT&T and the BOCs didnt like this much, and refused to interconnect with MCI. MCI had difficulty negotiating interconnection with AT&T, hired special counsel skilled in negotiations, and brought the issue before the FCC. In 1973, AT&T threw a curveball by filing interconnection tarriffs in 49 state PUCs, transforming MCI's transaction costs from one interconnection agreement, to 49 different agreements in each jurisdiction. In 1974, AT&T disconnected MCI. Finally, frustrated, In 1974, MCI, along with the Department of Justice, filed an antitrust suit against AT&T. On June 13th, 1980, the Court ruled in favor of MCI, awarding MCI $1.8 billion in damages. Two years later, AT&T would negotiate with DOJ the resolution of their antitrust lawsuit, agreeing to the breakup of the Bell System.
In 1963, Microwave Communications, Inc., the predecessor corporation to MCI,11 requested permission from the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to construct and operate a long distance telephone system between Chicago and St. Louis. The proposed system consisted of a terminal in each city and microwave radio relay towers connecting the terminals. Through this system, MCI intended to provide long distance, private line telephone service to business and industrial subscribers whose needs justified the exclusive or semi-exclusive use of a long distance telephone line. MCI also sought interconnections from its terminals to ordinary local telephone facilities, principally telephone wires running in conduits beneath the street. These interconnections were essential to MCI's ability to do business, since they provided the telephone or computer linkage between MCI's terminals and its individual customers in each city.
In 1969, after lengthy administrative proceedings in which AT & T and the other general service carriers opposed MCI's application, the FCC approved MCI's proposal. Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 966 (1969); 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970).12 The FCC's decision specifically authorized MCI to provide only point-to-point private line service not requiring connection to the nationwide switched network--that is, tie lines that would connect two or more locations without the use of switching machines. 18 F.C.C.2d at 953-54. The FCC also retained jurisdiction to order appropriate local interconnections.
The MCI decision resulted in a deluge of new applications to the FCC for authority to construct and operate facilities for specialized common carrier services. MCI filed applications for authority to provide specialized services among more than 100 cities. Other companies filed similar applications, creating a situation in which, in many instances, more than one carrier was seeking to provide specialized services over the same route. To deal with this situation, the FCC instituted a broad rulemaking inquiry designed to permit consideration in one proceeding of the policy questions raised by these numerous applications. Specialized Common Carriers, 24 F.C.C.2d 318 (1970) (Notice of Inquiry).
In June 1971, the FCC handed down its Specialized Common Carriers decision, approving in principle the entry of specialized carriers into the long distance telecommunications field, and declaring as a matter of policy that there should be open competition in the specialized services to which the decision applied. 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1970). Because AT & T, reversing its earlier position, agreed to negotiate with MCI and other new entrants for local interconnections, the FCC elected to defer consideration of MCI's claim that AT & T was misusing its power over local telephone service to gain a competitive advantage over potential specialized competitors.
The FCC's Specialized Common Carriers decision was hardly a model of clarity.13 The decision did not define the specialized services to which it referred, nor did it define the corresponding obligations that the FCC expected the general carriers (primarily AT & T) to assume in order to assist the new carriers. AT & T contended, both at the time of the FCC decision and throughout the pendency of this lawsuit, that the Specialized Common Carriers decision authorized only point-to-point private line services not requiring switched network connections, and that the obligations of the Bell System extended only to providing local distribution facilities for these point-to-point private line services. MCI, by contrast, has consistently taken the position that the Specialized Common Carriers decision authorized it to provide FX and CCSA type services, as well as point-to-point private lines, and that AT & T had a corresponding obligation to provide it with the switched network connections required for these services. MCI also contended, both before and after the Specialized Common Carriers decision, that AT & T was obligated to provide it with local distribution facilities at the same rate at which AT & T provided such facilities to Western Union, under a longstanding contract between those two carriers. AT & T disagreed, claiming that the contract then in effect with Western Union did not reflect AT & T's current costs, and that the price charged to MCI for local distribution facilities should be set so as to recover AT & T's costs on a current basis.
In September 1971, AT & T entered into interim contracts with MCI defining the kinds of interconnections that AT & T would provide for MCI's initial Chicago-St. Louis route and establishing the price for those interconnections. These contracts did not permit switched network connections for FX or CCSA type services, nor was the price set by the contracts for local distribution facilities comparable to that charged to Western Union.
During this same time period, the original MCI investors joined forces with William McGowan, an experienced business executive and engineer, to form a venture that envisioned the eventual construction and operation of a nationwide long distance telephone system. After scrutiny of the market it believed had been opened by the Specialized Common Carriers decision, MCI created a plan contemplating sales of 74,000 circuits (leased telephone lines) having an average length of 500 miles per circuit, or approximately 37 million circuit miles14 by the end of 1975. According to this plan, MCI expected its revenues to average $1.00 per circuit mile excluding AT & T's local connection charges, which MCI intended to pass on to its customers. Projected annual revenues for 1975 were approximately $350 million. Armed with these projections, MCI proceeded to raise $110 million by June 1972, making it one of the largest start-up ventures in the history of Wall Street. The funds were raised after review and analysis by leading lenders and large equipment suppliers who were either lending the funds or underwriting or guaranteeing the financing.
MCI commenced operations over its Chicago-St. Louis route on January 1, 1972. In the fall of 1972, MCI began construction of the first segment of its nationwide system, extending east and south from the original Chicago-St. Louis route. MCI initially expected to complete the first portion of its national network and commence customer service over major parts of the system by late summer 1973. Expansion to a second and a third group of smaller cities was to follow over the next three years. MCI planned to fund these capital expenditures from its initial $110 million capitalization, from substantial additional anticipated financing and from operating revenues.
During late 1972, while construction was progressing, MCI entered into negotiations with AT & T over the provision by AT & T of interconnections and local distribution facilities on the expanded MCI system. Because MCI had previously experienced difficulty obtaining satisfactory interconnections for its Chicago-St. Louis segment, MCI hired an experienced lawyer-negotiator to secure a national interconnection agreement with AT & T that would permit MCI to serve the entire market it believed the FCC had opened. These negotiations began in September 1972, and continued with little progress for the next nine months.
During this same period, MCI appealed to the FCC for help in breaking down what it viewed as AT & T's unreasonable negotiating stance. Through a series of informal complaints and conferences with FCC staff, MCI charged that AT & T was treating it unfairly, on the question of interconnections, in at least three respects:
(1) MCI claimed that AT & T was unlawfully denying it interconnections to the switched network for FX and CCSA services and for point-to-point service to customers located outside a local distribution area,15 including multipoint service;16
(2) MCI claimed that it was being charged excessive and discriminatory prices for the local distribution facilities provided by the Bell System; and
(3) MCI claimed that it was being harassed by Bell System employees in the provision of local distribution facilities through delays, improper installation, improper maintenance and other similar practices.
AT & T denied each of these charges. Both in its direct dealings with MCI and in its responses to FCC staff members, AT & T adhered to the position that the Specialized Common Carriers decision authorized only private line service not requiring switched network connections. AT & T also contended that it was providing MCI with all the interconnections to which MCI was entitled and that the prices it was charging for those interconnections were not excessive or unfair.
In August 1973, with negotiations still pending, and without informing MCI, AT & T decided to file with forty-nine of the state utility commissions interconnection tariffs that would be equally applicable to all carriers--including MCI and Western Union. By filing interconnection tariffs with the state commissions rather than with the FCC, AT & T made it more difficult for MCI to oppose the tariffs, since, in the words of one AT & T official, the interconnection "controversy would spread to 49 jurisdictions." PX 2148 at 2031. Even after making this unilateral tariff decision, AT & T continued to "negotiate" with MCI. After MCI accidentally learned of the state tariff plan, however, AT & T formally broke off all contract negotiations.
In early October 1973, several top MCI officials met with Bernard Strassburg, Chief of the FCC Common Carrier Bureau, to discuss a plan designed to resolve the interconnection controversies between MCI and AT & T. Pursuant to this plan, FCC Chairman Burch, on October 4, 1973, issued a letter on behalf of the Commission, rejecting AT & T's resort to state regulatory agencies as unlawful and asserting exclusive FCC jurisdiction over the interconnection dispute. Shortly thereafter, MCI wrote to Mr. Strassburg, inquiring as to the nature and scope of the services that MCI was authorized to provide and for which AT & T was obliged to supply interconnections under the Specialized Common Carriers decision. Mr. Strassburg replied by letter dated October 19, 1973, that these services included FX and CCSA, as well as services outside local distribution areas and multipoint services. On November 2, 1973, MCI filed a complaint in federal district court under section 406 of the Communications Act asking that AT & T be ordered to provide interconnections for these services.
On December 31, 1973, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction ordering AT & T to provide all of the interconnections sought by MCI, on the theory that such interconnections were contemplated and required by the FCC's Specialized Common Carriers decision. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T, 369 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1973). AT & T provided the required interconnections, but immediately appealed the district court's injunction. Meanwhile, the FCC, on December 13, 1973, issued its own order requiring AT & T to show cause why it should not be held to have violated the Specialized Common Carriers decision by refusing to provide the interconnections requested by MCI.
On April 15, 1974, the Third Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction issued against AT & T. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T, 496 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1974). On April 16, 1974, despite assurances that the FCC's "show cause" decision was expected "any day now," and despite FCC warnings that disconnection of MCI's customers would violate the Communications Act, AT & T ordered its local operating companies to disconnect MCI's customers on twenty-four hours notice. MCI alleged that the resulting disconnections caused turmoil among its customers and seriously damaged its reputation for reliable service. On April 23, 1974--eight days after the Third Circuit had vacated the injunction obtained by MCI--the FCC issued a decision ordering AT & T to provide the disputed interconnections.17 Bell System Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by Other Common Carriers, 46 F.C.C.2d 413, aff'd sub nom. Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026, 95 S. Ct. 2620, 45 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1975). The FCC held that it had intended to include both FX and CCSA services within the terms "specialized" or "private line" services as those terms were used in the Specialized Common Carriers decision. 46 F.C.C.2d at 425-27. AT & T provided the requested interconnections within ten days of the FCC's order.
In October 1974, MCI filed a tariff with the FCC for what the tariff referred to as metered use private line services, principally a service called "Execunet." Although the FCC did not immediately perceive it as such, this tariff was apparently designed to permit MCI to provide ordinary switched long distance service to users in any city to which its microwave system extended. See MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25, 40-43 (1976) (the "Execunet decision"). When the FCC discovered the nature and purpose of the new tariff, it declared the tariff unlawful and ordered MCI to discontinue providing ordinary long distance message service on the ground that the Specialized Common Carriers decision limited MCI's authorization to the provision of private line services. 60 F.C.C.2d at 35-44, 58.
MCI appealed the FCC's Execunet decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and, in July 1977, the Court of Appeals set the decision aside. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040, 98 S. Ct. 781, 54 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1978). In its opinion, the Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that "a service like Execunet was not within the contemplation of the [FCC] when it made the Specialized Common Carriers decision," 561 F.2d at 378, but held that the FCC had not conducted a sufficient hearing--either during the Specialized Common Carriers proceeding or at any subsequent time--to justify any limitation on the operating authority of MCI and the other new specialized carriers. Id. at 378-80.
The 1980 decision by the District of Columbia Circuit--handed down long after the events involved in the instant case occurred--rendered virtually meaningless the debate between MCI and AT & T over the proper interpretation and definition of the specialized private line services to which the Specialized Common Carriers decision applied. AT & T also claims that it was only by virtue of this Court of Appeals decision that MCI was able to achieve profitability since, according to AT & T, MCI's costs for private line services (including FX and CCSA) substantially exceeded the rates AT & T was then charging its large users under the Telpak tariff. See infra, pp. 1099-1100.
MCI's original complaint, filed March 6, 1974, contained four separate counts: monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize--all under section 2 of the Sherman Act3 --and conspiracy in restraint of trade--under section 1 of the Sherman Act. MCI alleged that AT & T had committed twenty-two types of misconduct, classifiable into several categories including predatory pricing, denial of interconnections, negotiation in bad faith and unlawful tying. MCI claimed at trial, on the basis of a lost profits study originally prepared in part for financing purposes, that it had suffered damages of approximately $900 million as a result of AT & T's allegedly unlawful actions.4
The case was tried to a jury between February 6 and June 13, 1980. After completion of MCI's case in chief, the district court directed a verdict in favor of AT & T on seven of the twenty-two alleged acts of misconduct.5 The remaining fifteen charges--all based on section 2 of the Sherman Act--were submitted to the jury. A special verdict form required the jury to make a separate finding of liability as to each of the fifteen charges, but permitted the jury to award damages in a single lump sum, without apportioning MCI's claimed financial losses among AT & T's various lawful and unlawful acts. The jury found in favor of MCI on ten of the fifteen charges submitted, and awarded damages of $600 million--a sum equal to two thirds the total damage figure claimed in MCI's aggregated lost profits study.6 The district court trebled this damage award, as required by section 4 of the Clayton Act, resulting in a judgment of $1.8 billion, exclusive of costs and attorneys' fees.
Quietly, almost without notice, our digital and physical worlds turned into a series of panopticons, a network of both private companies and governments intent on monitoring everything. They all have adopted a similar solution: Their objectives require the ability to target anybody (either for advertising or intelligence), yet as they don't know who they may wish to target at time of collection, they have chosen to collect data on everybody.
The tracking takes place in various forms, from elements and advertising on the page, to companies providing profiles and lists, to passive surveillance and active censorship of networks by governments and potentially criminals. These technologies are not purely passive but can also be used to exploit targets.
By building our own systems (or assigning them as homework), developing techniques to monitor and mitigate tracking, and participating as customers of private industry we can gain insights into how they work and the nearly invisible watchers affecting our modern world.
Speaker:
Nicholas Weaver received a B.A. in Astrophysics and Computer Science in 1995, and a Ph.D. in Computer Science in 2003 from the University of California, Berkeley. Although his dissertation was on novel FPGA architectures, he also focused on computer security, including postulating the possibility of very fast computer worms in 2001. He joined the International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) in 2003. His primary research focus is on network security, notably worms, botnets, surveillance, and other internet-scale attacks, and network measurement. Other areas have included both hardware acceleration and software parallelization of network intrusion detection, defenses for DNS resolvers, and tools for detecting ISP-introduced manipulations of a user's network connection.
"APA is the principal law governing how agencies make rules. The law prescribes uniform standards for rulemaking, requires agencies to inform the public about their rules, and provides opportunities for public participation in the rulemaking process. Most federal rules are promulgated using the APA-established informal rulemaking process, also known as "notice and comment" rulemaking. APA outlines a multistep process to initiate and develop rules and includes provisions for parties to challenge them, which [an agency] must follow. Many steps require agencies to provide public notice of proposed or final actions as well as provide a period for interested parties to comment on the notices-hence the "notice and comment" label. APA does not generally address time frames for informal rulemaking actions, limits on contacts between agency officials and stakeholders, or requirements for "closing" dockets." - FCC Should Take Steps to Ensure Equal Access to Rulemaking Information, GAO-07-1046, p. 8 (Sept. 2007)
"The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies to all executive branch agencies, including so-called independent regulatory agencies. [5 U.S.C. § 551(a)] The APA prescribes procedures for agency actions such as rulemaking, as well as standards for judicial review of agency actions. [5 U.S.C. §§ 551(a), 701-06] Rulemaking is the “agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,” [5 U.S.C. § 551(5)] where a rule is defined as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.” [5 U.S.C. § 551(4)]" - CRS 2011, p. 1.
SP 800-184 DRAFT Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery
NIST Draft Special Publication 800-184, Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery,
is available for public comment. The purpose of this document is to
support federal agencies in a technology-neutral way in improving their
cyber event recovery plans, processes, and procedures. This publication
provides tactical and strategic guidance regarding the planning,
playbook developing, testing, and improvement of recovery planning. It
also provides an example scenario that demonstrates guidance and
informative metrics that may be helpful for improving resilience of the
information systems.
The public comment period closes on July 11, 2016.
Send comments to: csf-recover@nist.gov.
See second link below for the Comment Template for Draft SP 800-184
"In
this document, the Federal Communications Commission seeks comment on
replacing the existing, fragmented regulatory regime applicable to
business data services (BDS) (i.e., special access
services) with a new technology-neutral framework, the Competitive
Market Test, which subjects non-competitive markets to tailored
regulation, and competitive markets to minimal oversight."
"Comments are due on or before June 28, 2016; reply comments are due on
or before July 26, 2016. Written comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act
proposed information collection requirements must be submitted by the
public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other interested
parties on or before August 2, 2016."
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Majority (202) 225-2927
Minority (202) 225-3641
June 7, 2016
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Communications and Technology
HEARING NOTICE
The Subcommittee on Communications and Technology will hold a hearing on Tuesday, June
14, 2016, at 10:15 a.m. in 2123 Rayburn House Office Building. The hearing is entitled “FCC
Overreach: Examining the Proposed Privacy Rules.” Witnesses will be announced and are by
invitation only. The hearing webcast will be available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/.
By Order of Chairman Walden https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings-and-votes/hearings/fcc-overreach-examining-proposed-privacy-rules
Is the Internet Fragmenting? Part 2: The Technical Lens
Please join Microsoft and the Greater Washington DC Chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC-DC) for Part 2 of our series on Fragmentation, "Is the Internet Fragmenting? The Technical Lens" at the Microsoft Innovation and Policy Center on Wednesday, June 15. Stakeholders from government, industry, the technical community, civil society, and other organizations will examine how technology choices are fragmenting the Internet and the role of technology in business and policy decisions.
This event is Part 2 of a four-part series of dialogues organized in response to recent developments related to the Internet that have prompted alarming questions about whether it is fragmenting. They include a diverse set of technical, economic, and policy developments and decisions that have been taken in response to the continued growth and globalization of the Internet and its evolving role as critical infrastructure for the digital economy. Taken together, they raise an overarching concern on whether the global Internet may be fragmenting from a universal system due to the intended or unintended consequences of technical, commercial, and/or political decisions taken without full consideration of their potential impact.
Wednesday, June 15th • 8:30 am – 10:00 am • Light refreshments provided. CLICK TO REGISTER
KEYNOTE: Dr. David Farber Adjunct Professor of Internet Studies and Distinguished Career Professor of Computer Science and Public Policy, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University
Dr. Milton Mueller Author & Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology School of Public Policy
Suzanne Woolf Internet infrastructure consultant, Member of Internet Architecture Board, Liaison to ICANN Board of Directors for the Root Server System Advisory Committee
Event Location: Microsoft Innovation & Policy Center 901 K Street, NW, 11th Floor, Washington, DC 20001 This event has been planned to comply with the requirements of the Legislative and Executive Branch gift rules. Executive Branch personnel wishing to attend should consult with their designated Agency Ethics Office.
Office Seeks Comment on Reduced Fee for Designating Agents under the DMCA
The United States Copyright Office has published a notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comments concerning a significant reduction in the fee for online service providers to designate agents to receive notifications of claimed infringement under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The Office is proposing the lower fee in anticipation of a new online system through which service providers will be able to more efficiently designate agents with the Office and the public will be able to more easily search for such agents.
At this time, the Office is soliciting comments solely with respect to the proposed $6 fee to designate agents in the new system. Accordingly, comments should be directed only to the appropriateness of the proposed fee. Written comments must be received no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on June 24, 2016. Additional information and instructions for filing comments are available here.
