Friday, November 03, 2017
Thursday, November 02, 2017
|Disc containing Morris Code|
at Museum of Science
"Morris sought to program the Internet worm to spread widely without drawing attention to itself. The worm was supposed to occupy little computer operation time, and thus not interfere with normal use of the computers. Morris programmed the worm to make it difficult to detect and read, so that other programmers would not be able to "kill" the worm easily. Morris also wanted to ensure that the worm did not copy itself onto a computer that already had a copy. Multiple copies of the worm on a computer would make the worm easier to detect and would bog down the system and ultimately cause the computer to crash. Therefore, Morris designed the worm to "ask" each computer whether it already had a copy of the worm. If it responded "no," then the worm would copy onto the computer; if it responded "yes," the worm would not duplicate. However, Morris was concerned that other programmers could kill the worm by programming their own computers to falsely respond "yes" to the question. To circumvent this protection, Morris programmed the worm to duplicate itself every seventh time it received a "yes" response. As it turned out, Morris underestimated the number of times a computer would be asked the question, and his one-out-of-seven ratio resulted in far more copying than he had anticipated. The worm was also designed so that it would be killed when a computer was shut down, an event that typically occurs once every week or two. This would have prevented the worm from accumulating on one computer, had Morris correctly estimated the likely rate of reinfection.
"Morris identified four ways in which the worm could break into computers on the network: (1) through a "hole" or "bug" (an error) in SEND MAIL, a computer program that transfers and receives electronic mail on a computer; (2) through a bug in the "finger demon" program, a program that permits a person to obtain limited information about the users of another computer; (3) through the "trusted hosts" feature, which permits a user with certain privileges on one computer to have equivalent privileges on another computer without using a password; and (4) through a program of password guessing, whereby various combinations of letters are tried out in rapid sequence in the hope that one will be an authorized user's password, which is entered to permit whatever level of activity that user is authorized to perform.
"On November 2, 1988, Morris released the worm from a computer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. MIT was selected to disguise the fact that the worm came from Morris at Cornell. Morris soon discovered that the worm was replicating and reinfecting machines at a much faster rate than he had anticipated. Ultimately, many machines at locations around the country either crashed or became "catatonic." When Morris realized what was happening, he contacted a friend at Harvard to discuss a solution. Eventually, they sent an anonymous message from Harvard over the network, instructing programmers how to kill the worm and prevent reinfection. However, because the network route was clogged, this message did not get through until it was too late. Computers were affected at numerous installations, including leading universities, military sites, and medical research facilities. The estimated cost of dealing with the worm at each installation ranged from $200 to more than $53,000.
"Morris was found guilty, following a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(a)(5)(A). He was sentenced to three years of probation, 400 hours of community service, a fine of $10,050, and the costs of his supervision."
- U.S. v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1991)
The Morris Worm also resulted in the creation of multiple new federal projects such as CERT with the mission of researching, thwarting, and alerting the network to new possible threats.
Robert Morris is reportedly a professor at MIT.
Monday, October 30, 2017
U.S. Copyright Office Issues Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Seventh Triennial Rulemaking Proceeding Under Section 1201
"The Copyright Office has published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the seventh triennial rulemaking proceeding under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 1201. Section 1201 provides that the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, may exempt certain classes of works from the prohibition against circumvention of technological measures that control access to copyrighted works.
"As set forth in its prior notice of inquiry, the Office established a new, streamlined procedure for the renewal of exemptions that were granted during the sixth triennial rulemaking. The Office has now reviewed all comments regarding current exemptions received in response to that notice. With this notice of proposed rulemaking, the Office concludes that it has received a sufficient petition to renew each existing exemption, and it does not find any meaningful opposition to renewal. Accordingly, the Office intends to recommend readoption of all existing exemptions.
"In addition, the notice outlines proposed classes for exemptions for which the Office now initiates three rounds of public comment. In the first round of comments, which are due December 18, 2017, the Office seeks legal and evidentiary submissions from parties who support the adoption of a proposed exemption as well as parties that neither support nor oppose an exemption but seek to share pertinent information about a proposal. Responsive legal and evidentiary submissions from those who oppose the adoption of a proposed exemption are due February 12, 2018. Written reply comments from supporters of a proposed exemption and parties that neither support nor oppose a proposed exemption are due March 14, 2018.
"Participants in the proceeding are encouraged to familiarize themselves with section 1201(a)(1) and the rulemaking requirements so they can maximize the effectiveness of their submissions. For more information, commenters should carefully review the notice of proposed rulemaking and submission instructions available at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/. Additional background information about section 1201 is available at https://www.copyright.gov/1201/, which contains helpful resources, such as video tutorials, the Office's recent policy study on section 1201, and links to prior rulemaking proceedings.
Friday, October 20, 2017
Truth and Misinformation :: Content Providers and Intl Transport :: Geoff Huston :: CFP Internet Law Works in Progress Conf
The Future of Truth and Misinformation Online Pew http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/19/the-future-of-truth-and-misinformation-online/
NANOG Vid: Telegeography, Optical Illusions: Content Providers and the Impending Transformation of International Transport https://youtu.be/0_6zk87pxRQ
NANOG Vid: Geoff Huston, Let's Encrypt with Dane https://youtu.be/09fNjMur1Gs
Call for Projects/Papers/Participation for 8th Annual Internet Law Works-in-Progress Conference, NYLS, March 24, 2018
Thursday, October 19, 2017
BEREC NN Report :: House Tech Hrg Cybersecurity Kaspersky Labs :: FCC FACA Broadband Deployment :: NTIA IOT Mtg ::
Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services
Notice of 11/08/2017 Virtual Meeting of Multistakeholder Process on Internet of Things Security Upgradability and Patching
NTIA will convene a virtual meeting of a multistakeholder process on Internet of Things Security Upgradability and Patching on November 8, 2017. The virtual meeting will be held on November 8, 2017, from 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., Eastern Time.
For further information contact Allan Friedman, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW., Room 4725, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-4281; email: firstname.lastname@example.org. Please direct media inquiries to NTIA's Office of Public Affairs: (202) 482-7002; email: email@example.com.
Report on Responses to NTIA's Request for Comments on Promoting Stakeholder Action Against Botnets and Other Automated Threats
This report identifies the common themes found in the responses to NTIA's "Request for Comments on Promoting Stakeholder Action Against Botnets and Other Automated Threats." It is not a comprehensive discussion of all comments, nor does it reflect a government decision. The full text of all comments is available here.
Tuesday, August 01, 2017
NTIA Comments on Promoting Stakeholder Action Against Botnets and Other Automated Threats https://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/2017/comments-promoting-stakeholder-action-against-botnets-and-other